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I. Introduction
It is time to re-visit an old friend.  Our age is uncertain, our anxieties profound, and our 
air still defiled by the stench of fear acts of mass terrorism have left like toxic clouds that refuse 
to dissipate.  Those acts of terrorism have raised old doubts (and given birth to new ones) about 
whether the laudatory principles we espouse in our public documents are, to some degree, the 
prescription for our own undoing.  
Among those principles are ones that speak directly to guarding our personal privacy. 
With fear in the air, we are tempted to barter those principles by granting greater power to the 
government in exchange for greater collective security.  We contemplate this knowing all the 
while that this is a zero sum game in which security is purchased in the currency of personal 
freedom.
In this contemplation, we need to revisit our old friend probable cause.  We need wonder 
whatever became of it and whether it can have meaning in such a nervous age.
At first glance, of course, probable cause seems like not so much a friend as a potential 
villain, limiting the government’s ability to probe into suspected criminal activity and thwart a 
new terrorist offensive.  We sense pressure to read it and other provisions of the Fourth 
Amendment as if they were penned in disappearing ink or contained a footnote that allowed for 
their suspension at the discretion of those elected to do the thwarting.  But something holds us 
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2back.  This is not just any friend we would dismiss, after all, but an old friend.  We are not quite 
certain that by paying the price in the zero sum game to indulge our fear we would not be risking 
the loss of something we cannot afford to lose.
This article explores the reason behind the instinct that holds us back.  It is an effort to 
determine if there is a core to our sense of justice that concepts like probable cause help to make 
a reality; a core that, as we struggle to deal with the political fallout of a nervous age, should be 
left alone.  
It is an open letter to judges, the administrators of probable cause, giving advice on the 
care and handling of a device born in antiquity but perpetually relevant.  It is a warning of what 
might happen if it slips through their hands.  It proposes what seems like a paradoxical solution:  
for probable cause to be understood more simply by all of us (and implemented more practically 
by judges), we ought to use the complex political theories of John Rawls as a guide. 
In the final analysis, this simple text submits that a re-visiting of probable cause is a 
search to find the core of our sense of justice, and the best processes we can use to bring about its 
closest approximation.  The process, it turns out, involves listening carefully to the most 
powerful force in the political universe – the reasoned voice of the governed. 
We will proceed simply.  First, we will note some of the criticisms of probable cause 
after September 11th and observe that such criticisms are nothing new.  Next, we will remind 
ourselves of the importance of probable cause within American constitutional jurisprudence.  
Then we will recount the frustrating path a judge or student would take to understanding this 
important concept simply by trying to discern its meaning by reference to precedent, 
nomenclature, mathematics, or history.  Finally, we will place probable cause in the realm of 
political science and see how the light of that world illuminates it. 
3II. Blaming Probable Cause
Thoughtful scholars writing in the wake of September 11th have questioned whether our 
understanding of the Fourth Amendment contributed to our vulnerability and have argued that 
our perceptions of that amendment must change to enable the government to interdict future acts 
of mass murder.2
2. Professor Etzioni has written a comprehensive analysis of the phenomenon of societal attitudes 
after September 11th regarding governmental powers of search and seizure in his book.  AMITAI ETZIONI, HOW 
PATRIOTIC IS THE PATRIOT ACT? FREEDOM VERSUS SECURITY IN THE AGE OF TERRORISM (Routledge 2004).  In his 
book, Professor Etzioni argues that “trade-offs” between security and implementation of the Bill of Rights are a 
necessity.  Id. at 1-3.  He posits that we can and should “refashion” our conception of these rights in the face of the 
need to prevent such future attacks.  Id. at 5.  Such a refashioning, he argues, is necessary to prevent the Republic 
from following the Weimar Republic into the pages of obscurity as he contends that it was “inaction in the face of 
threats, not excessive action” that caused the Weimar Republic to fail to preserve its institutions and be swallowed 
up by a totalitarian regimen.  Id. at 5-14.  While investigative tools such as large scale interviewing of groups of 
individuals “are not measures the United States would have taken in normal times,” they represent “a price we must 
pay for our enhanced security.”  Id. at 33-34.  
Other scholars have similarly argued for the expansion of police powers in the wake of the attacks.  See
William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137 (2002).  Professor Lerner has identified a 
specific instance of concern raised by various Justice Department officials regarding an interpretation of probable 
cause adopted by the Minneapolis Office of the United States Attorney prior to September 11th that arguably limited 
a search otherwise to be conducted of Zacarias Moussaoui.  Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable 
Cause, 81 TEX. L. REV. 951, 952-53 (2003).   
The events of September 11th evidently had an impact on the academic community as well.  In the October, 
2001 issue of the Michigan Law Review, Professor Thomas published a most thoughtful and fascinating analysis of 
the Fourth Amendment, arguing, inter alia, that the Fourth Amendment was, and should vigorously but primarily be 
interpreted to mean, a substantial limitation on the powers of the federal government.  
The principle concern in the Bill of Rights was not to protect innocent 
defendants.  The Framers instead intended to create formidable obstacles to 
federal investigation and prosecution of crime. An expansive protection against 
prosecution means, of course, that guilty as well as innocent people go free, but 
the Framers expressed no concern about this effect of the Bill of Rights.  The 
anti-Federalists simply distrusted prosecutors who would advance the federal 
government’s interests and federal judges who might be corrupt or biased 
against those who did not pay proper obeisance to the federal government.  
George C. Thomas III, When Constitutional Words Collide: Resurrecting the Framers’ Bill of Rights and Criminal 
Procedure, 100 MICH. L. REV. 145, 159-60 (2001).  He argues that “the Framers were not concerned with the 
government’s interests in solving crime,” and that while today we “fear criminals, the Framers feared the central 
government.” Id. at 173.  
Clearly, however, the difference in what we fear today from what the Framers feared, and the intensity of 
our fear, is markedly different in the aftermath of September 11th.  Professor Thomas acknowledges this; indeed he 
says “the world is different in 2001.”  He advises that another paper would be necessary to resolve the implications 
of his thesis that future Fourth Amendment analysis should return to a vigorous requirement of warrants for the 
federal government, but a lesser procedural demand with respect to the states when the Fourth Amendment is 
incorporated against them through the Fourteenth.  Id. at 174.
4Dissatisfaction with existing interpretations of the Fourth Amendment is not, however, a 
phenomenon that began on the afternoon of September 11, 2001.  Contrast the following 
quotations from scholarly articles published before and after the attacks.  
In his 2003 piece, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, Professor Lerner begins his 
conclusion with the following:
In the aftermath of September 11, several commentators mused 
that the Constitution would handicap our nation’s efforts to combat 
terrorism.  One observer wondered whether the Bill of Rights was 
so hopelessly out of touch with the reality and gravity of the threat 
to our nation that unless we “abandon key constitutional 
protections . . . deaths from terrorism [will number in the 
millions].”  This Article takes as its starting point the following 
principle:  Any interpretation that renders the Constitution a 
suicide pact is almost surely an erroneous interpretation.3
Seventeen years before the fall of the twin towers, Professor Grano observed the following in his 
article, Probable Cause and Common Sense: A Reply to Critics of Illinois v. Gates:4
This article has addressed the evidentiary burden that the 
government must carry before such an intrusion should be 
permitted.  I have argued that the government’s burden should not 
be defined at so high a level that it impedes legitimate law 
enforcement interests.  We need not interpret the Fourth 
Amendment’s probable cause requirement to leave us so secure 
against encroachments by government that we are left insecure 
against predatory behavior by our fellow citizens, behavior that 
also may destroy our liberty, our pursuit of happiness, and 
sometimes our very lives.  I have attempted to demonstrate that 
neither history nor common sense compels such a restrictive view 
of the probable cause requirement.5
Blaming probable cause is, of course, to blame the Framers of the Amendment who cast 
the term in constitutional stone in the first place.  Did they truly force our brave and dedicated 
3. Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 TEX. L. REV. 951, 1028 (2003) 
(internal citations omitted).   
4. Joseph D. Grano, Probable Cause and Common Sense: A Reply to the Critics of Illinois v. Gates, 
17 MICH. J.L. REFORM 465 (1984).
5. Grano, supra note 4, at 520.  See also Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for 
Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229 (1983) (internal citations omitted). 
5law enforcement officials to adhere to the Marquis of Queensbury rules while letting the other 
fighter use knives and attack after the bell?  Or did the Framers grant power commensurate with 
the threat, making such current criticism merely a situation of a laborer blaming his tools for a 
shoddy piece of construction, or more to the point, investigation?  
A rejoinder to criticisms that the Bill of Rights constitutes the “whereas clauses” of a 
suicide pact, is as old as the criticisms themselves.  Consider the eloquent passages of Ex Parte 
Milligan.6  There, Lambdin Milligan was spared the hangman’s noose by the Supreme Court’s 
grant of a Writ of Habeas Corpus vacating his conviction for treason during the Civil War.  He 
was tried summarily, denied the protections of a grand jury indictment and a trial by jury.7  In 
response to the government argument that the desperate events of the Civil War justified a 
relaxation of basic constitutional principles, the Court admonished:
The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and 
people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of 
its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all 
circumstances.  No doctrine, involving more pernicious 
consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any 
of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great 
exigencies of government.  Such a doctrine leads directly to 
anarchy or despotism, but the theory of necessity on which it is 
based is false; for the government, within the Constitution, has all 
the powers granted to it, which are necessary to preserve its 
existence; as has been happily proved by the result of the great 
effort to throw off its just authority.8
But, of course, that was a war in which the greatest weapon of mass destruction was probably 
canister fire and the enemy was usually sporting enough to present themselves in matching 
uniforms for ready identification on a defined battlefield.  May we still say today that the noble 
18th century language of the Constitution gives our collective entity all the power we need to 
6. 71 U.S. 2 (1866).  
7. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 108. 
8. Id. at 120-22 (emphasis added).
6survive?  Indeed, what was it that made the Milligan Court so sure that was true in the first 
place?  Can the Fourth Amendment still stand even if the twin towers have fallen?  Why is 
probable cause, the heartland concept of the Amendment, so important anyway?
III. The Importance of Probable Cause
a. As a Protection of a Specific Right
Understanding the nature of probable cause is a critical venture.  Its place is seen in the 
context of the right to which it relates.  That right was identified most poetically by Justice 
Brandeis in his dissent in Olmstead v. United States9 as follows: 
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions 
favorable to the pursuit of happiness.  They recognized the 
significance of man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his 
intellect.  They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and 
satisfactions of life are to be found in material things.  They sought 
to protect Americans and their beliefs, their thoughts, their 
emotions and their sensations.  They conferred, as against the 
government, the right to be let alone – the most comprehensive of 
rights and the right most valued by civilized men.10
According to no less an authority than Professor LaFave, this “right most valued” is 
protected at its core by the concept of probable cause.11
Indeed, the probable cause component of the Fourth Amendment constitutes a doctrine 
far more important to its meaning than does its so-called “warrant requirement.”  Scholars have 
often argued that the history of the Amendment shows the “warrant requirement” was not 
something ever truly required and, given that exceptions to the “requirement” are now so 
numerous, it is a requirement in name only.12  If a nervous age seeks to water down the 
9. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
10. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478-79.
11. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 3.1 (3d 
ed.).
12. Professor Lerner has called the warrant requirement one of two “presumptions” about the Fourth 
Amendment that turn out to be “fictitious.”  In discussing the warrant requirement, he points out that it is a 
“requirement” that has as many as twenty or more exceptions, leaving it a requirement honored essentially in breach.  
7Amendment’s protections in the name of security, not much more dilution to the “warrant 
requirement” is possible.  The target will be probable cause.  The casualty will be the right to be 
let alone.
One way to dilute probable cause is to act as if it has disappeared.  On January 19, 2006, 
the United States Attorney General published a 41-page, single-spaced defense of the asserted 
power of the President to tap phones of persons “reasonably believed to be linked to al Qaeda.”13
The thesis of this remarkable document is that without any explicit Congressional authority such 
as the Foreign Intelligence Security Act [FISA Act],14 and solely under the auspices of Article II 
of the Constitution, the President may order electronic surveillance of international calls of 
persons (including United States citizens) without a warrant, without probable cause, and with 
the Department of Justice and the National Security Agency designated as the only agencies 
reviewing these actions “to ensure that civil liberties are being protected.”15
Lerner, supra note 3, at 954-55.  As a side note, Professor Lerner’s second “fictitious presumption” is that probable 
cause is necessary for a constitutional search.  His argument here strikes me as somewhat less convincing. Examples 
of non-probable cause searches are either the administrative type searches at airports and DUI check points or the 
Terry-type street encounter.  Id.  Professor Lerner is certainly correct that large numbers of citizens are subject to 
these sorts of searches and that they do not require probable cause.  Nonetheless, the sort of searches that by their 
intensity and intrusiveness most significantly challenge Justice Brandeis’ right to be let alone are those in which 
probable cause remains a requirement.
Professors Sklansky and Amar have also written that the warrant requirement is not only excepted into 
virtual obscurity today, but does not have the sort of historical mandate we once might have believed.  Both argue 
that authorities in the 18th and 19th centuries simply did not view the warrant requirement as the more modern day 
Court has done.  See Akhill Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 767 (1994);  
David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1763 (2000).  Professor 
Amar tells us bluntly that:
the Amendment’s Warrant Clause does not require, presuppose, or even 
encourage warrants – it limits them.  Unless warrants meet certain strict 
standards, they are per se unreasonable.  The Framers did not exalt warrants, for 
a warrant was issued ex parte by a government official on the imperial payroll 
and had the purpose and effect of precluding any common law trespass suit the
agreed target party might try to bring before a local jury after the search or 
seizure occurred.    
Amar, supra, at 771-72 (emphasis in original).  Warrants, he concludes “were friends of the searcher, not the 
searched.”  See also Sklansky, supra at 774, 782.
13. U.S. Department of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National Security 
Agency Described by the President,[DOJ Report] (January 19, 2006), at p. 1.
14.   50 U.S.C. §§1803, et. seq.
15. DOJ Report, at p. 5.
8The term “probable cause” is mentioned in this document only six times.  Once, it 
appears when the Fourth Amendment is quoted.16  Another is when the FISA Act is quoted.17
The four remaining references are all on one page.  They are in citations to cases dealing with 
drug testing of high school students and an exigent circumstance where a man was made to wait 
outside his trailer while the police, who had probable cause to do so, got a warrant to search it.18
Were this document to be the only legal treatise on the Fourth Amendment to survive a 
cosmic cataclysm, future generations would believe that the Amendment’s use of the terms 
“warrant” and “probable cause” were surplusage.  The “touchstone” for evaluating the 
government’s justified intrusions of privacy, the text asserts, is simply “reasonableness,” 
“assessed under a general balancing approach” in which the government’s interest in defending 
the Nation from al Qaeda, quite obviously, wins the balance.19
But probable cause is not surplusage.  No reading faithful to the text of the Amendment 
can ignore it.  It means something very important about the core values this Nation that we 
protect from al Qaeda holds most dear.  It is a concept that the Constitution entrusts not to the 
same department of government doing the invasion of privacy, but to the Courts.  It is an 
entrusting that, like all examples of separation of powers, is meant to protect liberty through the 
structural integrity of our system as well as by specific reference to a protected right. 
b. As a Structural Protection of Liberty Generally
To truly understand the structural nature and importance of probable cause, I submit that 
we must know it by recognizing what it does when we deem that it exists.  A finding of probable 
cause is an authorization by our society for police to invade the privacy of an individual, to 
16. DOJ Report, at p.36.
17. DOJ Report, at p.18.
18. DOJ Report, p. 37, citing Board of Education v. Earles, 536 U.S. 822 (2002); Veronia School 
District v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); and Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001). 
19. DOJ Report, at p.37.
9violate that right to be let alone.  It is important both as an endpoint and a process to get to that 
endpoint. If we hold privacy in high regard, we will demand a heightened sense of certainty for 
the finding of probable cause since we know that the feeling of probable cause, once acquired, 
alters the relation between the citizen and their government in a most profound way.  It is a 
process that does not leave to one branch the sole task of determining when that endpoint is 
reached.
Probable cause is thus like a celestial body that we cannot see, but can sense because of 
its gravitational pull on other objects around it.  The process by which it is found, or found not to 
exist, defines the sphere in which the executive may operate, and requires that the executive 
justify an expansion of this sphere by proof judged objectively reasonable by a co-equal branch.  
It is no more a tangible thing than separation of powers or federalism but it operates in much the 
same way to frustrate the tendency of government toward tyranny by reducing the occasions in 
which arbitrary power may be wielded.20  In this sense, it may not ultimately address any one 
right specifically, but operate to protect all of liberty generally.  
A number of scholars have identified this critical aspect of the Fourth Amendment. While 
we will see that the Amendment’s history fails us in certain respects, here it is reliable. The 
Amendment was meant to curtail the capricious search powers exercised under general warrants 
and writs of assistance, devices so offensive to a populous determined not to live under an 
arbitrary government that, by its arbitrariness, was properly accused of tyranny.21
20. I have, at great length, sought to demonstrate that separation of powers and federalism are the two 
structural pillars of personal liberty.  See Bruce A. Antkowiak, Contemplating Brazilian Federalism: Reflections on 
the Promise of Liberty, 43 DUQ. L. REV. 599 (2005).  
21. Tracey Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why the Supreme Court should Leave Fourth Amendment 
History Unabridged, 82 B.U.L. REV. 895, 941-43, 966-77 (2002); Sklansky, supra note 12, at 1763, 1813-14; Amar, 
supra note 12, at 771-72; DAVID RUDOVSKY, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES: ARTICLE I, SECTION 8, 300-01; Boyd, 116 
U.S. at 624-25, 630. 
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In Boyd v. United States,22 the Supreme Court spoke of the fear of the invasion of 
personal security, liberty, and property that the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect.23
The Fourth Amendment addressed the evil of the exercise of arbitrary power through 
discretionary searches undertaken by federal officials; interpreting the Amendment was an 
ongoing effort to engage in a struggle against such unchecked power.24  In United States v. 
Henry,25 the Court again observed that the probable cause requirement was meant to combat the 
pernicious general warrant and limit arbitrary action by the government in all respects.26  And, of 
course, in Olmstead v. United States,27 Justice Brandeis reminded us of the need to recognize that 
the Fourth Amendment protects a right to be let alone, a right of infinite variety and one most 
particularly reflecting a structural disposition that the government is to do those specific things it 
has been delegated to do, and otherwise leave us alone.28
Focusing on whether probable cause (and the Amendment generally) necessarily bans a 
specific kind of search may miss the larger point.  At a deeper level, the process of probable 
cause may act as an overall admonition to the government that its powers are limited and defined 
not simply by the type of things it is empowered to do, but in how it is permitted to do them, 
with structures in place at the constitutional level ready to enforce those limits. 
The importance of structural limits was recognized from the outset.  For example, in 
Federalist No. 84, Hamilton confronted the argument made against the Constitution that it was 
22. 116 U.S. 616, 624-25 (1886). 
23. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630. 
24. Id.  
25. 361 U.S. 98 (1959). 
26. Henry, 361 U.S. at 100. 
27. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
28. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478-79.  An outstanding review of these cases and the underlying themes of 
privacy they reflect may be found in Professor Gormley’s article, 100 Years of Privacy, 5 WISC. L. 
REV. 1335, 1357-74 (1992).
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deficient in failing to contain a Bill of Rights.29  He dismissed the notion that because 
declarations of specific rights appeared in documents like Magna Carta, one must appear in our 
Constitution.30  Our Constitution was written against a different, and new, set of assumptions.  
The older declarations, he said, were “stipulations between kings and their subjects” and as such, 
“they have no application to constitutions, professedly founded upon the power of the people and 
executed by their immediate representatives and servants.”31  Strictly speaking, under our 
Constitution, “the people surrender nothing; and as they retain everything they have no need of 
particular reservations.”32
Given this premise, a Bill of Rights is “not only unnecessary . . . but would even be 
dangerous” as it “would contain various exceptions to powers which are not granted” and would, 
therefore, “afford a colorable pretext to claim more than they were granted.”33  The “plan of the 
convention,” the plan of government, is itself a bill of rights, he argued, since it serves “to 
declare and specify the political privileges of the citizens in the structure and administration of 
government” and defines “certain immunities and modes of proceeding, which are relative to 
personal and private concerns.”34
Of course, Hamilton lost the argument about the need for a Bill of Rights.  But his 
underlying point is of great importance:  the initial plan of government built in a check on 
arbitrary power even while it sought to grant power to the central government it was creating.  
No Amendment passed thereafter to provide further protection to the people could countermand 
that structural protection; indeed, to the extent that the Fourth Amendment sets up a clear 
29. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, NO. 84, 512-514 (Clinton Rossiter, ed., Signet 
Classic 1999). 
30. HAMILTON, supra note 29.
31. HAMILTON, supra note 29, at 512. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 513.
34. Id. at 514.
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mandate for a judicial check on executive power to search by an insistence on a finding of 
probable cause, that structural protection is given a specific set of teeth. 
   This need for structural protections of liberty finds a further profound articulation in the 
philosophical writings of Phillip Pettit and his concept of antipower.35
   For Pettit, the traditional notion of freedom, one he says was embraced by the Framers, 
was that true freedom lies in a system wherein no one is subject to the arbitrary power of 
another, regardless of whether arbitrary conduct actually occurs. 36  He describes it in this way:
Under the conception of freedom as antipower, I am free to the 
degree that no human being has the power to interfere with me; to 
the extent that no one else is my master, even if I lack the will or 
wisdom required for achieving self-mastery.  The account is 
negative in leaving my own achievements out of the picture and 
focusing on eliminating a danger from others.37
The actual act of interference is not nearly as critical as the elimination of an arbitrary 
power that allows a dominating entity to act without fear of opposition or consequence, and 
denies to the one subjugated either the capacity to assert himself in response, or to petition a 
neutral body to assert his position and punish such arbitrary transgressions.38
The best way to achieve antipower, Pettit argues, is to:
consider the introduction of protective, regulatory, and 
empowering institutions.  I do not say that every institution will 
necessarily increase antipower, of course; some may have indirect, 
counter production effects, and empirical work will be required to 
determine which mix of institutions does best.  I say only that 
protective, regulatory, and empowering institutions represent the 
sorts of options that we ought to be considering if we are interested 
in the promotion of antipower in a society.39
35. Philip Pettit, Freedom as Antipower, 106 ETHICS No. 3, 576-604 (The University of Chicago Press
1996).  I discuss this extensively in Contemplating Brazilian Federalism: Reflections on the Promise of Liberty.  
Antkowiak, supra note 20.
36. Pettit, supra note 35, at 576-78.
37. Id. at 578.
38. Id. at 579-80.
39. Id. at 590.
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A constitutional Amendment that directly prohibits searches conducted unreasonably, and 
arbitrarily, and employs a system of review by a court holding the searcher to an independent 
standard, is certainly an institution in the service of antipower. A concept like probable cause, as 
a component of that institution, is a doctrine in service of a basic conception of freedom. 
Giving vitality to the Fourth Amendment’s protections is thus every bit as important as 
preserving federalism or separation of powers, that which Madison called “a double security . . . 
to the rights of the people,”40 and what the Supreme Court later called a system to “reduce the 
risk of tyranny and abuse.”41  Tinkering with the meaning of probable cause is thus doing more 
than just allowing a given search in a given case; over time we risk altering a portion of the 
blueprint of a republic that we otherwise seem to be quite fond of admiring. 
So we find that our search for the meaning of “probable cause” has led us into a 
passageway that leads close to the center of the political earth.  And yet we still do not have 
much of a handle on the nature of it as a device to actualize the great goals it is seemingly 
positioned to achieve.  
To say “we” here presupposes something quite philosophical but not something very 
practical.  While John Locke may have been right that what the state of nature really lacks is “an 
40. Antkowiak, supra note 20, at 606 (quoting THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 183, 
204-05 (Michael Kammen ed., Penguin Books 1986).
41. Antkowiak, supra note 20, at 609 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)).  
Parenthetically, one may note how separation of powers ideas are built into the probable cause procedure.  Probable 
cause limits the potential for an oppressive government by involving all three branches in the probable cause 
equation.  Probable cause exists as the determination of the likelihood of a particular crime, not just of a person 
being “bad” or suspicious.  
In Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003), a unanimous Supreme Court identified the issue as whether 
the officer had probable cause to believe Pringle committed the specific crime of felony drug possession.  Id. at 370-
73.  Pringle, arrested in the company of two others in a car with a significant quantity of drugs and a significant 
amount of cash, was not merely present there; rather, the office was reasonable in inferring that there was “a 
common enterprise among the three men” that supported the belief each had violated the statute.  Id.  The legislature 
therefore has an initial role in defining the crimes for which searches can occur.  The executive branch certainly 
plays a part in trying to enforce those laws by seeking authorization to search private places in which evidence may 
be found.  And the judicial system operates, either before or after the fact of the search, to determine the legitimacy 
of the executive’s efforts and to balance the needs of individual privacy.  No single branch can act without the 
concurrence of the others.  
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established, settled, known law, received and allowed by the common consent to be the standard 
of right and wrong” he was also right that it also needs “a known and indifferent judge” to 
administer it.42  While we all must search for the meaning of probable cause, it is our judges who 
will put that meaning into effect and guidance for them in this search is crucial. 
As we will see, the job of searching for a practical meaning of probable cause to guard 
that “right to be let alone” and to make it a tangible component of the structural protection of 
liberty is not easy.  The help we have given to judges to date hardly makes this job any easier.
IV. The Courts and Probable Cause
Clearly, the governmental official positioned to make probable cause a meaningful 
concept is a judge.  Unlike in the case of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, where committees of 
citizens undertake the task of assessing the government’s request for authorization to punish 
someone,43 the criminal system leaves the probable cause determination squarely in the lap of the 
judge.  Whether the judge is passing on an application for a search warrant or assessing the 
validity of a warrantless search after it occurs,44 it is the judge who must decide whether the facts 
42. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, 403 (Isaac Kramnick, ed., Penguin 
1995).
43. I have discussed the matter of juries and reasonable doubt in two prior articles:  Bruce A. 
Antkowiak, Judicial Nullification, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 545 (2005); Bruce A. Antkowiak, The Ascent of an 
Ancient Palladium: the Resurgent Importance of Trial by Jury and the Coming Revolution in Pennsylvania 
Sentencing, 13 WIDENER L.J. 11 (2003).  
44. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b):
(b) Authority to Issue a Warrant.  At the request of a federal law enforcement 
officer or an attorney for the government:
(1) a magistrate judge with authority in the district – or if none is
reasonably available, a judge of a state court of record in the district –
has authority to issue a warrant to search for and seize a person or 
property located within the district . . .
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (b) (1).  See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 12 (d) which provides:
The court must decide every pretrial motion before trial unless it finds good 
cause to defer a ruling.  The court must not defer ruling on a pretrial motion if 
the deferral will adversely affect a party’s right to appeal.  When factual issues 
are involved in deciding a motion, the court must state its essential findings on 
the record.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 12 (d). 
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and circumstances known by the police justified a level of certainty that authorized the invasion 
of privacy that was to occur or had occurred.
As we have seen, this is a matter of no small importance.  But how is the judge supposed 
to do this?  At the most basic level, a judge should begin by recognizing what “probable cause” 
is as a thing to know, and then assess some sources of insight as to how to know it. 
a. Probable Cause as the Thing In Itself
While philosophers are sometimes wont to launch a discussion by pondering the “thing in 
itself,”45 let us simply describe what probable cause is.  Probable cause is a standard of proof.  It 
describes a state of human certainty.46  It is a point on a continuum upon which both the 
presumption of innocence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt also exist.  According to a most 
thorough study of this point, the placement of probable cause on this continuum is a matter of 
some significance in its history.
In Beyond Reasonable Doubt and Probable Cause,47 Professor Shapiro argues that the 
law’s concept of certainty derived in part from the notion by John Locke and others that anything 
based upon human testimony could never reach more than some level of probability, and that, as 
such, defining the degree of probability was crucial.48  Probable cause came under more intense 
scrutiny of the law once the process that implemented it moved from reliance purely upon the 
suspicions of the alleged victim to the requirement that a neutral magistrate assess the evidence 
45. With apologies to Immanuel Kant, among others.  See generally, The Critique of Pure Reason 
(Cambridge University Press 1998). 
46. Grano, supra note 4.  Professor Grano has said that seeking to understand “the broader issue of the 
degree of certainty that probable cause requires” is the primary issue that Supreme Court jurisprudence on the matter 
sometimes overlooks in favor of an assessment of the trustworthiness of the evidence upon which that level of 
certainty is based.  Id. at 473-74.
47. BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, “BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT” AND “PROBABLE CAUSE:” HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW OF EVIDENCE (University of California Press 1991).
48. SHAPIRO, supra note 48, at 60.   
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independently before an invasion of privacy could occur.49  The evolution towards a judicial 
determination of probable cause meant objectively evaluating whether a defendant’s conviction 
would likely be obtained based upon the evidence gathered to date. 50  Professor Shapiro 
concludes:
The American probable cause standard represents the latest stage 
in a long historical evolution in which the justification for arrest 
moves from the personalized suspicion of a directly involved party, 
through the generalized suspicions of a more distanced party based 
as much on the suspect’s life-style as on particular events, to the 
rough estimate of a very distant official of the chances that a 
suspect will be convicted if tried.51
Thus, while nominally a noun, probable cause is much more an adjective, describing a 
state of certainty about a person’s guilt based on identifiable facts that justify an invasion of his 
privacy. It then morphs readily into a most active constitutional verb, sanctioning that invasion. 
Examined merely in its noun form, however, it is a most difficult concept to grasp. It is not a 
tangible thing that can be measured in liters, meters, or degrees.  Like any love, fear, or wonder, 
it cannot be quantified or objectified.  Feelings may be discussed by analogies (as when we say 
that we love our neighbor as our self), but never measured by them, as they escape all common 
modes of measurement or calculation.52
But not being able to describe one’s sense of love seldom has consequences that impact 
the privacy of individuals or defines their relationship with their government.  Serious 
49. Id. at 135-43. 
50. Id. at 142-44.  
51. Id. at 145.
52. Indeed, any attempt that speaks of probable cause as an “it” is bound to fail, as the “it” is nothing 
more than a manner or means by which we try to make operative a deeper, shared consensus of our sense of justice.  
The attempt to use various disciplines not sensitive to this underlying truth is not only futile but dangerous, as we 
risk seriously losing focus on the fundamental meaning of the thing in such a process.  In a prior work, I have 
discussed the concept of standard of proof in terms of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  I have tried to argue that it 
too is an imprecise term that has evolved over time in ways that are troubling, particularly when courts have tried to 
describe it as a tangible object.  In that process, I submit, we turn the presumption of innocence on its head.  
Antkowiak, supra note 44, at 558-65.
17
consequences follow a judge’s sense that he “feels” probable cause existed, so insight as to when 
that feeling should be recognized is vital.
Judges critically examining that “feeling” will use tried and true methods.  As creatures 
of the law, they will look to precedent; as creatures that use language as the means of their craft, 
they will seek linguistic insight; as scholars envious of the precision of mathematics, they will 
dabble with arithmetic formulae; and as students of history, they will hope the past enlightens the 
present. 
In many respects, each such path will lead to disappointment.
b. Sources of Possible Insight
i. Probable Cause as the Orphan of Precedent
There are two profound proofs that the Supreme Court has given up trying to define 
probable cause.  First, in Maryland v. Pringle,53 the Court said it was giving up:
On many occasions, we have reiterated that the probable-cause 
standard is a “’practical, nontechnical conception’” that deals with 
“’the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which 
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.’” 
“[P]robable cause is a fluid concept--turning on the assessment of 
probabilities in particular factual contexts--not readily, or even 
usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”
The probable-cause standard is incapable of precise definition or 
quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities 
and depends on the totality of the circumstances.54
Second, in Illinois v. Gates,55 the Court advised judicial officers to apply “the totality of 
circumstances test”56 to probable cause problems.  That is not really a test at all; it is a pointless 
tautology identifying nothing a judge really needs to know.
53. 540 U.S. 366 (2003).
54. Pringle, 540 U.S. at 370-71 (internal citations omitted).
55. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
56. Gates, 462 U.S. at 230-31.
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What court does not consider the totality of all circumstances relevant to any 
determination?  Only an irresponsible court will pick and choose a few relevant circumstances to 
decide any issue under the law.  To say that a court must consider the “totality” of the 
circumstances is thus to tell a court nothing whatsoever about which of the hundreds of 
circumstances it should consider that constitute the relevant totality. 
 For example, would the mother’s maiden name of the officer conducting the search be 
one of the circumstances to consider?  Surely not, but does “the totality of the circumstances 
test” tell us why that is not a relevant consideration?  This “test” is nothing more than the law’s 
concession that it cannot find words sufficiently helpful in its thesaurus to guide this crucial 
judgment.  It is a white flag in a war of words.  It reads:  Do the best you can. Be reasonable.
Surely, lower courts can be given, and find, better guidance.
ii. The Failure of Language
The inability of the Court in Maryland v. Pringle to find a sensible definition points to a 
general failure of nomenclature in this area.  As Professor Shapiro has observed, attempts by the 
Supreme Court to define probable cause in the latter part of the 20th century failed to come up 
with definitions that did more than generally describe the concept of probability.57  The failure is 
understandable:
We may be a long way from an involved individual’s subjective 
suspicions, but we are little closer to defining a place somewhere 
between mere surmise and beyond reasonable doubt – no doubt
because we have no conceptual or linguistic stages between 
nothing and moral certainty.58
Professor Bacigal observes that “semantic interpretation” of the term “probable” is 
possible only with placing the term somewhere between the range of a 0.1% to 100% 
57. See, e.g., Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959) (“probable cause exists where the facts 
and circumstances known to the officer warrant a prudent man in believing that the offense has been committed.”). 
58. SHAPIRO, supra note 48, at 147.
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likelihood,59 and  argues that the attempt by the Supreme Court to use language describing 
probable cause “has neither improved upon nor worsened the linguistic uncertainty surrounding 
the term probable.”60
If neither the Supreme Court nor the authors of dictionaries can define terms that convey 
an accepted sense of when evidence reaches the magical melting point of probable cause, judges 
should abandon the effort early.  To try to answer the question of what probable cause is simply 
by linguistics is an exercise doomed to failure.  Poets, not lawyers, are best suited to express 
human feelings.  Unless we are willing to take more of our law from Dylan Thomas than from 
Justice Thomas, we should abandon trying to find in words alone insight about processes critical 
to the freedom of the individual.
iii. The Imprecision of Mathematics
Worse yet, mathematics fails us here.  Any attempt to borrow the concepts of 
mathematics to solve the riddle of probable cause should be feared, even though the term 
“probable” seems to have led us into the land of numbers.
Math seduces lawyers with the siren song of precision, certainty, and constancy – the 
normal stuff our practice denies us.  Thus, it is not surprising that first rate academicians will 
often flirt with importing mathematical principles into a legal concept that beckons us with a 
name so seductively statistical.
Although stopping short “of endorsing precise mathematical expressions of probable 
cause,”61 Professor Bacigal argues extensively for the employment of principles of mathematical 
59. Ronald J. Bacigal, Making the Right Gamble: the Odds of Probable Cause, 74 MISS. L. J. 279, 
281-82 (2004).
60. Bacigal, supra note 60, at 281-82.  Later in his article, Professor Bacigal nonetheless gives five 
terms describing degrees of certainty and ultimately seeks to assign mathematical equivalents to them:  “slightest 
possibility,” “reasonable possibility,” “substantial possibility,” “probability,” or “high probability.”  Id. at 334.  One
has to wonder, however, if feelings are so unique to individuals that one man’s possibility is another’s high 
probability, to the point that any attempt at a rigorous analysis of this from a linguistic standpoint proves 
unsatisfying at best.
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“expressions of probabilities” to “assist, if not exclusively control, probable cause 
determinations.”62  He posits that properly used mathematical and scientifically valid profiles can 
assist in the probable cause determination,63 and that mathematical probabilities can supplement 
traditional methods of assessing probable cause by courts.64
Professor Lerner, while observing that few courts “have summoned the courage, or 
foolhardiness, to propose a number (e.g. 30% probability for probable cause),”65 argues for a 
framework of analysis for reasonableness in searches that plunges into the wilds of calculus.  
Using variables such as probability (P), the social benefit or value associated with the prevention 
or detection of a particular crime (V),  the social cost or privacy intrusion resulting from a 
particular kind of search (C), and the discounting of that intrusion by the likelihood that a search 
will fail to uncover evidence (a “privacy multiplier”) (M), he proposes a formula as follows:  P x 
V is greater than (1 – P x (C x M)).66  Calculators may need to be installed in each courtroom. 
This is an intriguing analysis.  Without question, it is a helpful tool to organize thoughts 
and priorities regarding the probable cause decision, but it hardly makes that decision any easier 
for a judge.  Unless there is a catalog to which a court can look to assign a proper probability for 
the finding of contraband, a separate axis to measure the social benefit associated with the 
prevention or detection of a particular crime, and an the electronic scale to factor in the social 
cost arising from the particular kind of intrusion, the court is left exactly where it is now in trying 
to define the parameters of probable cause.  He who sets the values on the variables is the one 
who determines the outcome of this interesting equation. 
61. Id. at 339.
62. Id. at 303-04.  
63. Id. at 301-02.
64. Id. at 309, 338-39.  
65. Lerner, supra note 3, at 995-96.
66. Id. at 1019-28.  
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Probable cause is a statement of science, but political science, one in which the language 
of mathematics is a foreign tongue.  Mathematicians would bristle if a student solved an equation 
by pointing to a “reasonable” answer instead of the right one; mathematicians should understand 
that what we measure in the law lies at a golden mean between the perfection of their numbers 
and the lyrics of the poet.
iv. The Frustrating Inadequacies of History
Judges in search of this golden mean will turn to history for two broad purposes.  First, as 
a general matter, the historical context of the term “probable cause” may provide some insight as 
to its proper current application and, second, if the actual intent of the Framers may be discerned, 
something of a mandate will exist to apply the term in its original spirit.
Unfortunately, according to a broad judgment of the academic community, neither 
purpose may wholly be fulfilled.
a. The Search for the Historical Meaning of Probable Cause
The history of probable cause (really, the whole of the Fourth Amendment) has been 
sketched many times by outstanding historians.67  As indicated earlier, Professor Shapiro has 
given an in-depth history of the evolution of probable cause, particularly from a procedural 
standpoint, tracing its origins from the suspicion of the wronged party to a more objective 
assessment made by a detached judicial officer.68  Most unearth the earliest manifestations of 
probable cause language in 13th century England in the concept of “suspicion” that supported 
actions by the constable in effecting arrests.69  Suspicion sufficient to warrant intervention could 
67. See, sources noted infra.
68. SHAPIRO, supra note 48, at 135-36. 
69. Jack K. Weber, The Birth of Probable Cause, 11 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 155, 158-59 (1982). 
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come from the word of “good and responsible men” as well as certain circumstantial proofs 
justifying the intervention by a court for further investigation.70
For our purposes, however, any further, detailed recitation of the details of this history is 
unimportant.  What is of interest is the widespread judgment of historians that while probable 
cause may appear in the broad contours of history, no specific meaning of use to a modern 
understanding of its core purposes is possible from a study of those contours. 
Results of attempts to draw common law lessons on the meaning of probable cause have 
been described as miscellaneous and contradictory, and wrong in most respects,71 leaving such 
attempts as largely pointless exercises in determining the modern meaning of the concept.72
The relevance of history has been described as “disputable”73 with scholarship about it 
“badly confused”74 and generally of limited utility.75  Professor Rudovsky indicates that “there is 
no settled judicial or scholarly position on the meaning, purpose and construction of the Fourth 
Amendment,” rendering the matter of its history one of nominal importance at best in modern 
interpretation.76
Indeed, many of these fine historical tracts agree that resort to history alone can provide 
us no set meaning of probable cause.  Rather, the authors have concluded that attempts to define 
or describe it have produced variable, ambiguous, and shifting meanings over time, to the point 
that it is arguably incapable of being defined in any critical way simply by reference to its 
70. Weber, supra note 70, at 159-61.  Class bias in the criteria to justify “suspicion” was evident.  Id. 
at 162.  See also Sklansky, supra note 12, at 1805-06. 
71. Lerner, supra note 3, at 972-73. 
72. Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment “Reasonableness,” 98 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1642 (1998).
73. Grano, supra note 4, at 478. 
74. Amar, supra note 12, at 759. 
75. RUDOVSKY, supra note 21, at 301.
76. Id. 
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history.77  Justice Stevens made this point in his recent concurring opinion in Georgia v. 
Randolph:
The study of history for the purpose of ascertaining the original 
understanding of constitutional provisions is much like the study of 
legislative history for the purpose of ascertaining the intent of the 
lawmakers who enact statutes. In both situations the facts 
uncovered by the study are usually relevant but not necessarily 
dispositive. This case illustrates why even the most dedicated 
adherent to an approach to constitutional interpretation that places 
primary reliance on the search for original understanding would 
recognize the relevance of changes in our society.78
One of the problems in dealing with the history of the Fourth Amendment is that its 
history occurred, as history is wont to do, so long ago.  Considering a centuries’ old 
jurisprudence in a modern context is valuable if and only if most of the underlying assumptions 
that were extant during the historical period continue to be operative in the modern age.  
Viewing history in context is thus critical and may, in respect to certain matters, limit the utility 
of Fourth Amendment history in the 21st century.79
Despite these criticisms, of course, certain judges continue to use history to justify their 
positions.  As writers have pointed out, however, judges on both sides of any case are often able 
to use history to support their views or provide political cover for unpopular decisions.80
To say that the history of the Fourth Amendment is inconsistent and contradictory is, 
however, to err much as one errs who claims that statistics lie.  The history of the Fourth 
77. Colb, supra note 73; Grano, supra note 4, at 478; Bacigal, supra note 60, at 288; SHAPIRO, supra 
note 48, at 147.  For the American experience, it is wise to recall another glitch in the resort to history for insight on 
the meaning of probable cause.  In citing English history for the purpose of understanding probable cause, we must 
recognize that we had the temerity to rebel against England and reject the history that led to summary search powers 
that caused so many of our citizens so much distress at the hands of officials of the Crown.  Maclin, supra note 21, 
at 959-62; Grano, supra note 4, at 478.
78. 164 L.Ed.2d 208,228 (2006). 
79. Maclin, supra note 21; Colb, supra note 73; Bacigal, supra note 60, at 288; RUDOVSKY, supra 
note 21, at 301. 
80. Maclin, supra note 21, at 898-901, 909; Colb, supra note 73; Sklansky, supra note 12, at 1809.  
Also.  Compare the opinions of Justices Stevens and Scalia in Georgia v. Randoph, 164 L.Ed. 2d 208 (2006). One 
author has described any court’s reference to history as “purely forensic.”  Lerner, supra note 3, at 974-76.
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Amendment is what it is; it may be gleaned from the annals of English history, the writings of 
Hale and Coke, or from the ancient cases that surrounded its articulation.  In the end, it is the use 
of history by current authorities in the name of a “new originalism,” that is problematic.  The 
frustration this causes is summarized by Professor Maclin in this way: 
The thesis of this article is that the Court’s use of history in Fourth 
Amendment cases has been unpredictable and inconsistent. 
Consequently, the Article proposes that the Court stop considering 
the historical origins of the Fourth Amendment unless it is able to 
develop a more effective and consistent method by which do so. . . 
Although history can provide significant insights into the Framers’ 
thinking about the Amendment, the Court’s current use of the 
Fourth Amendment history neither accurately reflects the Framers’ 
“underlying vision” of the Amendment nor provides a useful 
methodology for deciding modern search and seizure cases.  
Accordingly, unless the Court develops a more appropriate method 
for interpreting the complexity of the Fourth Amendment’s origins, 
it should stop relying on history when deciding Fourth Amendment 
cases.  It is in this sense that this Article suggests the Court should 
simply let sleeping dogs lie.81
This view provides the transition point to the second question we ask of this history.  If its long 
history provides no singular message about its meaning, may we at least narrow the focus and 
see what those who wrote this term into the Fourth Amendment meant by it when they put it 
there.
b. The Search for the Framers’ Intent
 Judges who make a specific search through history in hopes of finding the Framer’s 
understanding of probable cause that explicitly controls a current pending case may well come to 
a conclusion reached by many scholars:  the Framer’s intent was that there should be no fixed 
meaning to probable cause at that level. 
81. Maclin, supra note 21, at 897-98 (internal citations omitted).  Professor Maclin points out the 
intriguing anomaly that judges intent on giving the government more leeway to conduct searches often times must 
disregard history since, for example, in knock-and-announce and exigent circumstances cases, history is contrary to 
the leeway the courts have granted.  Id. at 917, 937. 
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 Professor Lerner argues that probable cause is neither the “north star” of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence nor something the Framers intended to be cast “in constitutional 
amber.”82
Professor Amar has also posited that probable cause was not to be a fixed standard; the 
seriousness of the harm and the intrusiveness of (and the reason for) the search are all matters 
that should affect the determination of whether the search was reasonable.83
Professor Bacigal claims that the variation in the standards of probable cause appearing 
over time84 affected the Framers to the degree that they did not even consider the common law 
ideas of it, even if a clear common law idea of probable cause ever existed.85  To them, the term 
“probable cause” was not a term with an established legal meaning.86  He concludes that 
probable cause has ultimately been reduced today to what it has been in history, simply an 
admonition to “just use your common sense and act reasonably.”87
Professor Sklansky provides a most insightful commentary on why probable cause is a 
concept detached from the bounds of history and some rigid formulation of the Framers’ intent.88
He points out that the classic test for defining when a police action is a search has an element 
society’s willingness to recognize the defendant’s expectation of privacy as reasonable.89  The 
society doing this recognizing is a society of the defendant’s contemporaries, not those who 
expected things in and around 1791.90  For this issue, by definition, resort to history is proper 
only if the expectations remain the same.  
82. Lerner, supra note 3, at 954, 976-78, 1029.  
83. Amar, supra note 12, at 784-85. 
84. Bacigal, supra note 60, at 283. 
85. Id. at 284.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 317-18.
88. Sklansky, supra note 12.  
89. Id. at 1739-40. 
90. Id. 
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Professor Sklansky also argues generally that the Framers did not bar a particular class of 
searches that they knew at the time to be overly intrusive, but instead adopted a standard of 
reasonableness to be interpreted over time and in the context of the American society then doing 
the interpreting.91  He urges that the Fourth Amendment was not meant to be a shorthand 
reference to the then existing common law because, had that been the Framers intent, they would 
have said so.92  To this point, I would add that when the Framers intended to refer to existing 
common law principles, they did so explicitly, as in the Seventh Amendment.93
Any attempt to identify with exactitude the Framers’ original intent thus fails, Professor 
Sklansky argues, because the Framers did not intend to set forth this jurisprudence in the 
concrete of the age in which the Amendment was penned.94  Rather, insofar as it evinces the 
Framers’ intent, the history of probable cause may be best read as describing a paradigm of the 
kind of arbitrary abuse that the Framers thought should be curtailed now and in the future.95
History puts a burden of judgment on courts, not the mandate to become better historians.96
But is that judgment unrestrained by any core meaning to probable cause that exists 
regardless of the date on which the issue arises?  If we read the Framer’s intent to be that 
probable cause is universally flexible in content and a constitutional chameleon in form we will, 
in a nervous age, read it out of the Fourth Amendment.  This will happen if we overtly or 
91. Id. at 1791.
92. Id. at 1810.  
93. U.S. CONST. Amend. VII.  The Seventh Amendment provides:  
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty 
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, 
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according 
to the rules of the common law.
Id.
94. Sklansky, supra note 12, at 1810.  
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
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covertly agree that the seriousness of the offense under investigation may be weighed to the 
extent that it supersedes other factors in supporting a probable cause finding.
While some scholars agree that, in writing the Fourth Amendment, the Framers were not 
concerned with advancing the goals of federal law enforcement because they saw the reach of 
the federal government as far less than what it is today,97 many also accept the role of the 
seriousness of the offense in the probable cause equation, even though that acceptance would 
radically expand the search power of the state.98
 The significance of weighing the seriousness of the offense as an unlimited factor in the 
probable cause finding cannot be understated.  If probable cause is a feeling of certainty, based 
upon facts gathered that suggest the guilt of a defendant of a specific crime, taking into account 
the seriousness of that crime in an unbridled way radically lowers the quantum of facts necessary 
to justify the intrusion into privacy.  If (forgive the mathematics) probable cause equals facts 
times the seriousness of the crime, the closer the seriousness of the crime reaches an ultimate 
point, the lesser are the facts needed to justify the search.  Putting a crime such as terrorism into 
this equation means that intrusions into privacy could be occasioned by just about any level of 
facts that the government could offer as a justification.99
97. Maclin, supra note 21, at 917-19; Thomas, supra note 2, at 157-62.
98. Colb, supra note 73, at 1724-25; Lerner, supra note 3, at 1019-20, 1027-28; Amar, supra 12, at 
784-85, 801-02; Bacigal, supra note 60, at 323-33.
99. A variant of the argument that the seriousness of the crimes should be taken into account is 
presented by Professor Bacigal.  He argues that where crimes present a “danger of imminent repetition,” a lesser 
form of probable cause should be required.  Bacigal, supra note 60.  He would make a distinction between 
investigating crimes that have already occurred and ongoing criminal activity that threatens future societal harm.  
Bacigal, supra note 60, at 323-33.  But few crimes ever seem to be wholly self-contained, without portending any 
future such criminal activity.  One murder may well lead the police to conclude that a dangerous and desperate 
individual is on the loose who must be captured before they kill again.  Moreover, the crime that probably occasions 
more searches than any other single crime is the interdiction of drugs and drug related contraband.  By nature, these 
are all crimes which are ongoing and which threaten future societal harm.  To adopt the standard that lowers the 
quantum of proof necessary to find probable cause here is to effectively lower it across the board in a way that 
would render the probable cause finding a brutal protection of this sort of privacy intrusion that the Fourth 
Amendment seems to have been constructed to prevent.
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So accounting for offense seriousness may, in certain cases, take probable cause 
completely out of the Constitution.  Is that possibly what the Framer’s intended?  If so, why did 
they bother to write it down?  If so, why does probable cause continue to exist in our collective 
jurisprudential conscience as a relevant issue? 
A simple fact of legal life shows that there is a core to the understanding of probable 
cause not subject to the whims de jour of a court.  We are governed by a Constitution that is, no 
matter what else we may think it is, a law that, perhaps inconveniently to some at times, is 
written down.  Words that drafters put on paper must be put into force by courts charged with the 
duty of interpreting and applying them.  While the Framers did not provide a glossary to the Bill 
of Rights critically defining “probable cause,” and while they may well have understood that it 
was a term that would have to be interpreted in a contemporary context by judges of the day, 
they did not give the courts free reign to do whatever they pleased.  Having gone to great lengths 
to limit the powers of the legislative and executive branches of government, it is absurd to 
assume that the Framers let judges operate unrestrained by anything but their individual good 
faith.  Indeed, history demonstrates that no one put blind faith in judges as the final outpost 
against tyranny.100  Judges, too, have to follow the “rule of law.”101
By advising judges on the implementation of probable cause, we are not simply being the 
court jesters to the king.  We are helping the courts understand that the supreme law of the land, 
a law deriving its authority from the consent of the governed, uses a specific term to restrict the 
power of the courts as they, in turn, define the power of the executive to invade personal privacy.  
100. Antkowiak, supra note 44, at 31-34. 
101. The “rule of law” idea is, of course, a central concept of the Enlightenment theory upon which so 
much of the constitutional theory is based.  See generally, Frank Marini, John Locke and the Revision of Classical 
Democratic Theory, 22 WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY 172, 175-76 (March 1969). 
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The term, the restriction, has meaning that transcends the vagaries of the moment.  It has a core 
that lasts.
Further evidence of a core to an understanding of probable cause lies in this.  History 
teaches us that probable cause is a very old friend, one that has been around the law for hundreds 
of years. That longevity is the product of something quite primal.  In an oft quoted article on 
probable cause, the author writes:
But shifting standards as to the precise amount of cause needed 
does not conceal a fact that the insistence on probable cause is a 
glory of American legal history, and of the English and common 
law, as well as of standards in the English speaking world. And 
this demand for adequate grounds for governmental intrusions like 
arrest is echoed in many other countries and found in international 
instruments, reflecting a deeply felt yearning on the part of 
mankind in general.102
It has survived despite many times of great exigency.  Its survival as a meaningful 
concept tells us there is substance behind its form.  Somehow, there must be a core 
understanding of the process of probable cause, one that sustains in days and times in which the 
magnitude of the potential offenses may readily wipe out the requirement altogether if the 
calculus for finding it would permit it.  That understanding, I submit, reflects even deeper core 
values of justice that probable cause serves, accounting for its longevity. 
Such understanding is to be found in a philosophical analysis of probable cause, one 
taking into account the reasoned process of societal consensus to which judges can refer when 
they make the determination as to whether the government has justified the invasion of the 
privacy of the citizen before them.
Why we are just the latest in a long line of citizens that includes our Framers (and will 
include generations hence) to yearn for probable cause, and how that yearning may be satisfied 
102. Weber, supra note 70, at 166 (internal citations omitted).
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in a nervous or any other age, are critical matters that lie at a level of meaning deeper than 
history may readily reveal.  An effort to find the core of the concept it reflects, is a question 
answerable by neither mathematics nor science nor history nor even law per se.  It is in the basic 
philosophy of the Republic that we must look.  That philosophy is best seen through the eyes of 
the science of politics, particularly, the work of John Rawls.103
IV. Searching for Probable Cause in New Venues: Philosophy and Political Science
The political philosophy of John Rawls may help us address two important matters about 
probable cause.  First, through an adaptation of his “original position” analysis, a method to think 
about probable cause determinations may be found.  Then, in his broader concepts of public 
reason, we may see why probable cause, as a concept that arises from a rational societal 
consensus, has such longevity and is so consistently compelling.  
a. Finding Probable Cause Through a Reasoned Consensus:  Rawls’ Original Position
If we understand probable cause to be an ancient yearning on the part of individuals to 
create a livable space between themselves and their governments, an intuitive sense104 that there 
is indeed a fundamental right to be let alone that a process administered by courts can 
implement, then there must be some way to understand how probable cause manifests itself in 
time and through time, in times of great exigency, and in times when states of relative calm 
abide.  To find that core understanding of the probable cause process we could ask “the ablest 
103. Having invoked his name, an important caveat and disclaimer is appropriate.  I do not profess to 
be versed in each of the delicate intricacies of a philosophy that Rawls himself has evolved and refined over a 
considerable period of time. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT (Erin Kelly, ed., The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press 2001); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press 1971); John Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 67 PHIL. REV. 164 (1958).
Nor do I seek to adopt or import all of the concepts that he weaves together in the complex tapestry of his 
form of political liberalism.  Rather, as a student of Rawls, I borrow from him certain discrete conceptions that I 
posit are entirely pertinent to a discussion of probable cause. I am also aware of the reasoned criticism of Rawls by 
authors such as Etzioni.  ETZIONI, supra note 2, at 7-8, 11, 91-94.
104. Weber calls it “the horse sense of the ages.”  Id. at 161.
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and the purest men.”105  But history has taught us that many of the greatest political wisdoms of 
our time come from not a single voice, but from the chorus that comes from the reasoned process 
of democratic consensus.  How do we access that voice?  How do we frame the question we wish 
to ask it?
The question is framed by considering that there are always three distinct parties affected 
by a court’s determination about whether the government’s evidence is sufficiently compelling to 
merit the finding of probable cause and authorize the invasion of privacy that flows from it.  
First, of course, there is the person whose privacy is invaded.  While writers sometimes 
view that individual in less than flattering terms,106 we must remember that search and seizure 
rules operate to protect innocent people; for we are all, at least as the fairytale we have been told 
in law school goes, presumed innocent until a jury of our peers judges us otherwise.  Of course, 
we may sometimes actually be “innocent” in that we really do not have the cocaine or the bloody 
knife in our home when the police battering ram shatters our door.
 The second person in the equation is the victim of the crime under investigation.  We 
may be them as well from time to time.
The third party at the table of probable cause is the society in general, or at least those 
proximate enough to the particular case to be aware of the decision the court makes about 
whether the search met the probable cause standard.  They (we) seek the benefits of a 
constitutional system that frustrates the formation of a tyrannical government but enjoys the 
benefits of a government that forestalls the terror of anarchy.  This third entity would like to 
believe there is a moral basis to our governmental philosophy, that is, a basic orientation to 
105. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 399 (1798) (Iredell, J., dissenting).
106. Loewy, supra note 5; Amar, supra note 12, at 796-97. 
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provide a system that allows the individual to live in an environment that maximizes his ability 
to utilize his reason in the service of higher pursuits of his own choosing.107
To one degree or another, all three entities, that is, each of us, yearn for justice.  To weigh 
and account for these interests is the essential philosophical question of probable cause.
Various scholars posit a proper weighing of these interests, using various formulations 
that reflect underlying, a priori judgments about the “proper” nature of things.108
What is critical, though, is that whatever approach we take focus on the issue that the 
Fourth Amendment addresses in its most essential terms:  the proper relation between the 
individual and the government.  All of the scholarly approaches noted in the margin, as well 
reasoned and thoughtful as they are, make judgments about that relationship that purport to be 
empirically obvious.  They proceed from an assumption about first principles and, indeed, while 
107. See Antkowiak, supra note 44, at 567-76; RONALD J. PESTRITTO, FOUNDING THE CRIMINAL LAW: 
PUNISHMENT AND POLITICAL THOUGHTS IN THE ORIGINS OF AMERICA (Northern Illinois University Press 2000).
108. Presumably, Professor Lerner would have a judge affix the values to his reasonableness 
framework, making some calculation of the social benefit of the search as well as the degree of privacy invasion 
multiplied by, of course, his privacy multiplier. Lerner, supra note 3, at 1019-28.  It is not clear, however, how a 
judge should go about fixing those standards other than by employing raw intuition on a case-by-case basis.  
Professor Grano tells us that the American Law Institute (ALI), in its 1975 Model of Criminal Procedure, 
disdained the term probable cause, using instead “reasonable cause” based upon its a priori judgment that society 
needs efficient crime prevention more than it needs personal privacy.  Grano, supra note 4, at 495. 
Professor Grano himself argues that the probable cause finding, one that balances “individual interests 
against community interests” is one that, if it is understood to mean a factual finding of more probable than not, 
“excessively exults the individual.”  Id. at 497.  He calls for the implementation of a “community model,” one which 
places as its paradigm the notion that if an individual shares the benefits of the community he must “make 
reasonable sacrifices” on behalf of it in order to solve crimes.  Id.  He argues that in such a case, it would be 
permissible to arrest ten people, nine of whom are presumably innocent, and expect them to sacrifice their liberty 
and privacy to solve the crime committed by one of them.  Id.  “Most probable cause issues should involve only the 
question of whether the police had a well grounded suspicion concerning the target of their action.”  Id. (elevating, 
presumably, the interests of the community he believes are paramount).  
In his 1994 article, Fourth Amendment First Principles, Professor Amar argues that placing the remedy for 
probable cause (and other Fourth Amendment) violations in the criminal system is itself a societal choice that 
achieves what he posits are ineffective results.  Primarily, he argues that the exclusionary rule rewards the guilty by 
allowing them to suppress evidence of their crime and, by doing so, elevates the criminal defendant to “a kind of 
private attorney general.”  Amar, supra note 12, at 793-97.
As an enforcer of the Fourth Amendment, Amar labels defendants a terrible and “awkward champion,” 
having no extended view of the meaning of the Amendment and caring only about suppression rather than overall 
societal views.  Id. at 796.  Compensation for a violation of the Fourth Amendment should not “flow to guilty.” Id. 
But rather, tort actions wherein monetary and injunctive relief could be granted should be preferred.  Id. at 815-19. 
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a judge struggling with a probable cause issue would welcome the ability to ground a decision by 
reference to such principles, they must first be comfortable in the methodology used to identify 
them.  For such a methodology, I propose that the judge seek to understand the process by which 
the governed functions in its most able and pure state to reach a rational consensus about the core 
values of justice probable cause seeks to serve. The judge, I submit, may find a proper 
methodology to that end in Rawls’ concept of the original position.
A well-ordered society, Rawls says, is one in which everyone accepts the same political 
conception of justice accepted by everyone else; the society then employs as its main political 
and social institutions structures that serve those principles of justice, and fosters a willingness in 
its citizens to apply those principles as their duties and obligations in society require.109  “In a 
well-ordered society . . . the public conception of justice provides a mutually recognized point of 
view from which citizens can adjudicate their claims of political right on their political 
institutions or against one another.”110
Implemented in a “fair system of cooperation,” these principles are not derived from an 
“authority distinct from the persons cooperating,” or from “natural law”; rather, they proceed 
from an agreement among “free and equal citizens” who negotiate them rationally and with an 
eye on what they regard as their “reciprocal advantage.”111  That agreement arises in the first 
instance in the Rawls’ process of “original position.”112
He assumes that persons acting on self-interest and employing reason come together for 
the purpose of negotiating the rules under which they will be governed once a “veil of 
109. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT (Erin Kelly, ed., The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press 2001).
110. Id. at 8-9. 
111. Id. at 14-15.
112. Id.
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ignorance” is lifted and their society is formed.113  They negotiate these rules not knowing who 
they will be once that veil of ignorance is lifted, but knowing that the principles they negotiate 
will bind them in future circumstances regardless of what position they find themselves in once 
their society is formed.114  The process that a rational person would go through under these 
circumstances is simple:
Hence each person will propose principles of a general kind which 
will, to a large degree, gain their sense from the various 
applications to be made of them, the particular circumstances of 
which being as yet unknown.  These principles will express the 
conditions in accordance with which each is the least unwilling to 
have his interests limited in the design of practices, given the 
competing interests of the others, on the supposition that the 
interest of others will be limited likewise.  The restrictions which 
would so arise might be thought of as those a person would keep in 
mind if he were designing a practice in which his enemy were to 
assign him his place.115
As one negotiates not knowing on which rung of the social ladder he would be at the time 
society comes into being, one carefully calculates his rational judgments to insure that he does 
not find himself, by the operation of chance, so totality disadvantaged that he would find life 
within that society intolerable.  The negotiator will write the rules, a) dispassionately, before 
exigencies cloud his judgment;116 b) rationally, using his best faculties; c) with self interest in 
mind, and d) blindly, such that he can live in the world his rules will govern.117
113. Id.
114. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 67 PHIL. REV. 164, 170 (1958); RAWLS, supra note 111, at 15-
16.
115. Rawls, supra note 111, at 172.  An excellent rendering of Rawls’ theory of justice in this regard is 
presented by Professor Samuel Gorrowitz in his essay John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, reproduced in 
“Contemporary Political Philosophers.”  Dodd, Mead and Company New York (1975) at page 272 and following.
116. It is not time to fashion such a methodology for probable cause when planes are being flow into 
towers, or in the immediate aftermath of acts of mass murder.  As in the days following the American Civil War, the 
temper of the times may not allow “calmness in deliberation.”  Milligan, 71 U.S. at 102.  But times exist when 
matters of such importance can be discussed without passion or the “admixture of any element not required to form 
a legal judgment.” Id.  Judges need to use a process that carefully, rationally, and dispassionately accounts for the 
interests of the three parties in every probable cause/search and seizure equation.  
117. Rawls’ approach has sometimes been compared with or, at least, spoken of in the same context as, 
a political application of the biblical Golden Rule.  See generally, Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Fairness 
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Rawls, of course, does not assume that anything like the “original position” has or 
actually could take place.  It is, however, an important “thought-experiment for the purpose of 
public and self-clarification.”118  It is a way to determine that “the principles of justice the parties 
would agree to . . . would specify the terms of cooperation that we regard – here and now – as 
fair and supported by the best reasons.”119
Applying this “thought-experiment” to our analysis of probable cause is minimally 
insightful and, at maximum, quite exquisite.
We assume that the three parties (in effect, ourselves projected into the different roles), 
positioned behind a veil of ignorance, are negotiating a rule about how much information the 
government should have before it is permitted by the courts to intrude into the privacy of an 
individual.  The negotiators understand that when the veil of ignorance is lifted, they will apply 
that rule regardless of where they find themselves in the probable cause/search triangle.  
As they may be the victim of the crime under investigation, they would certainly not want 
police officials to be so hamstrung in solving it that searches would not take place unless the 
perpetrators were kind enough to expose the evidence to plain view.  
Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 1016, n.106 (February 2001); David Barnhizer, Truth or Consequences in 
Legal Scholarship?, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1203, 1229 (Summer, 2005); George M. Cohen, When Law and 
Economics Met Professional Responsibility, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 273, 282, n. 50 (November 1998).
It is also an approach that resonates of John Locke.  In the Second Treatise, Locke writes that reason, which 
is the law of Nature, teaches that “no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions.”     LOCKE, 
supra note 43, at 396.  Charity towards all is, apparently, good political science.
Even earlier than Locke, Richard Hooker would extol reason as a matter of divine origin but one so universal that it 
would bind all men as rational beings, whether they ascribed to sacred scripture or not. While scripture and reason 
together were necessary for complete knowledge, reason could provide a common basis for governance and a 
justification for all positive law. See DANIEL F. EPPLEY, THE REFORMATION THEOLOGIANS:  RICHARD HOOKER 
(1554-1600), at 258 (Carter Lindberg, ed., Blackwell Publishers 2002); DEBORA KULLER SHUGER, HABITS OF 
THOUGHT IN THE ENGLISH RENAISSANCE:  RELIGION, POLITICS, AND THE DOMINANT CULTURE, at 27-28 (University 
of Toronto Press 1997); W.D.J. CARGILL THOMPSON, THE PHILOSOPHER OF THE “POLITIC SOCIETY”, at 26-27 (W. 
Speed Hill, ed., The Press of Case Western Reserve University 1972).
118. RAWLS, supra note 111, at 17.
119. Id.
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However, they may also be the person whose privacy is invaded by that search.  They 
must therefore afford the target of the search at least the presumption that the invasion of privacy 
would be troubling in any event and shocking if a mistake resulted in a truly (not just 
presumptively) innocent person’s home being searched. 
Finally, they may be a neighbor knowledgeable about the resolution of the probable cause 
question that directly affected the victim and target.  That neighbor wants to view the search 
process involving the other two with a sense of security at the reasonable ability of police to 
enforce the criminal laws, but without the fear that the police have the unbridled and arbitrary 
capacity to threaten intrusions in places where the right to be let alone has its most profound 
meaning.  
What rule would we agree to if there was an equal probability that we would fill one of 
these three roles but have to write that rule in advance, not knowing who we would be when the 
rule was applied?  If we did not know which of these three we would be when the veil lifted, 
would we not fashion standards for probable cause that we could live with regardless of our 
place in the ultimate resolution of the search decision?
The probable cause equation cannot be determined by looking from only one of these 
perspectives.  To achieve a reasoned, balanced judgment, a court must recognize that all three 
considerations are valid and must be taken into account when it is determined whether a 
particular search has exceeded the bounds of reasonableness due to an insufficient factual basis 
for the governmental intrusion.
For a judge, the question of probable cause thus becomes:  would a rational, self-
interested person adjudicating this case, find the amount of evidence presented at the time of the 
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search sufficient to justify it regardless of whether they would turn out to be the victim of the 
crime, the person searched, or the neighbor down the street?  If so, probable cause exists.
For judges to think of the roles in a “veil of ignorance” manner is to reason in the best 
posture to uncover the core principles of the protection of privacy in a civilized world.  It is a 
way to defeat the presence of arbitrary power of government that the Fourth Amendment 
espouses and the process of probable cause protects.  A judge trying to determine whether 
probable cause exists in a given case, and presented with an argument that the seriousness of the 
crime charged justifies a search despite the absence of facts that would justify the intrusion of 
privacy in other circumstances, must ask himself whether all three of the parties in the probable 
cause triangle, when sitting behind the veil of ignorance, would have agreed that in such case the 
search should proceed even if it meant their door being kicked in.  
The Rawls’ conception does not occur in a fantasy world in which threats of terrorist 
attacks are unknown or disregarded.  Like the founders of the Republic extolled in Ex Parte 
Milligan, the negotiators behind the veil are familiar with the struggle of persons against tyranny 
and anticipate the exigencies that will befall any republic during the course of its history.120
The rules for probable cause, as conceived in the Rawls’ veil of ignorance manner, have a 
consistency over time; they represent a law “for rulers and people . . . at all times, and under all 
circumstances,”121 as they are adopted for “the best reasons.”122  Rules written by rational people 
pursuing self-interest and anticipating that they could be any one of three persons within the 
probable cause triangle are rules framed for the purpose of “guarding the foundations of civil 
120. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 109, 124-25.
121. Id. at 120-21. 
122. RAWLS, supra note 111, at 17. 
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liberty against the abuses of unlimited power.”123  They are rules for times of great stress and 
urgency and afford to government all the power it needs to survive.124  Any later argument that 
such rules would have to be amended in order to preserve that nation would be subject to the 
criticism that if such argument were true “it could well be said that a country, preserved by the 
sacrifice of all the cardinal principles of liberty, is not worth the cost of preservation.”125  After 
all, the rules were written neither by members of a suicide pact nor by lambs so desperate for 
security that they were willing to be lead to slaughter by the hand of a tyrant.
Will this process always and invariably produce the same answer in each judge who 
applies it?  Of course not.  The human factor in judges is all too real to expect that any “thought-
experiment” will produce consistently predictable results.  But this notion does chart a common 
course, one that accounts for all the essential considerations in a rational manner consistent with 
both the primacy of the individual and the needs for an ordered and orderly society.
 b. Probable Cause and Public Reason
For Rawls, contemplation of the basic principles of society does not end when the veil of 
ignorance is lifted.  Reason, and the process of rational consensus, is a powerful force once 
unleashed by political structures that look to the consent of the governed for their legitimacy. 
The historical “yearning” for probable cause may, it turns out, be reflective of this indomitable   
force since enforcing a probable cause process to check arbitrary powers of government is just 
so, dare we say it, reasonable. 
Rawls discusses several processes that occur once the veil is lifted and a well-ordered 
society proceeds. For example, rational people, he tells us, engage in an ongoing process of 
123. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 127.
124. Id. at 120-21. 
125. Id. at 127. 
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“public justification,”126 which is “a political conception of justice for a society characterized, as 
a democracy is, by reasonable pluralism.”127  He describes how public justification works in a 
well-ordered society in this way:  
We saw that in a well ordered society effectively regulated by a 
publicly recognized political conception of justice, everyone 
accepts the same principles of justice.  These principles provide, 
then, a mutually acceptable point of view from which citizens 
claims on the main institutions of the basic structure can be 
adjudicated.  An essential feature of well ordered society is that its 
public conception of political justice establishes a sheer basis for 
citizens to justify to one another their political judgments:  each 
cooperates, politically and socially, with the rest on terms all can 
endorse as just.  This is the meaning of public justification.128
Public justification is unlikely to occur on all principles in a political society. However, 
Rawls hopes that consensus on the basic principles (the “constitutional essentials”) which govern 
the general structure of government and the basic rights and liberties of citizenship (including 
freedom of thought, association and conscience) will be within that consensus, all governed by 
the rule of law.129
A component for achieving this sense of public justification is what Rawls calls reflective 
equilibrium, a process whereby individuals internally sort out through reason and self interest 
those principles they find most conducive to their own best interest, and then, by taking into 
account principles of justice espoused by others in their society, achieve a wide reflective 
equilibrium – that is, that “the same conception [of justice] is affirmed in everyone’s considered 
judgments.”130  It is as if the negotiation behind the veil was perpetually ongoing, done not with 
a gun placed to anyone’s head, but with the rational recognition that times of great exigency may 
126. RAWLS, supra note 111, at 7.
127. Id. at 26. 
128. Id. at 27. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at 31. 
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well be just over the horizon and principles solid enough to sustain us through those times need 
to be affirmed now.  The effort is to achieve something quite practical.  “The most reasonable 
political conception for us is the one that best fits all our considered convictions on reflection and 
organizes them into a coherent view.  At any time, we cannot do better than that.”131
For Rawls, the original position, reflective equilibrium, and public justification become 
further involved in the value of public reason in a constitutional democracy.  Professor Larmore 
describes public reason in this way:
Its concern is the very basis of our collectively binding decisions. 
We honor public reason when we bring our own reason into accord 
with the reason of others, espousing a common point of view for 
settling the terms of our political life. The conception of justice by 
which we live is then a conception we endorse, not for the different 
reasons we may each discover, and not simply for reasons we 
happen to share, but instead for reasons that count for us because 
we can affirm them together. This spirit of reciprocity is the 
foundation of a democratic society.132
As the product of the rational forces that form society, this consensus is of consummate 
importance. 
But it is more.  The original position may be the product of rules that stress rationality 
and self-interest, but the veil of ignorance changes the nature of that process from an exercise in 
selfishness to one of public- mindedness; the rules imposed on the negotiation by the veil 
constitute, Larmore tells us, “moral limits” on the information the negotiators use to decide the 
rules they write for society.133  What comes from behind the veil is a sense of a shared, common 
good that is then publicly affirmed, defining what a “well-ordered” society must be.134 Achieving 
131. RAWLS, supra note 111. 
132. CHARLES LARMORE, THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS:  PUBLIC REASON, 368 (Samuel 
Freeman, ed., Cambridge University Press 2005).
133. LARMORE, supra note 136, at 367.
134. Id. at 368.
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this is something reasonable people will yearn for over time and, even through periods of passing 
irrationality, constitutes the home to which rational people will return. 
The longevity of probable cause is most likely explained by the fact that while we can 
flirt with other ideas about preserving the right to be let alone and keeping a government from 
becoming a tyrant, probable cause keeps stepping forward to remind us that it really can work to 
give us a balance of freedom and security a well-ordered society should covet.  The force of 
reason, rational consensus, and our need to espouse public reason all operate to bring us back to 
probable cause with the same relentless force which gravity exerts to bring objects back to earth. 
This primal phenomenon has been recognized in other constitutional contexts.
While it is unclear whether Justice John Harlan ever had the opportunity to read John 
Rawls, Harlan’s insight about this matter as reflected in his dissent in Poe v. Ullman,135 indicates 
that he and Rawls were reading from a common source.
Harlan dissented in Poe from the Court’s refusal to consider on the merits a law that
threatened a married couple with criminal prosecution for the use of contraception.136  Harlan 
would have not dismissed the case on procedural grounds and would have declared the statute 
unconstitutional.  While it is interesting for our purposes that at two points in his opinion he 
specifically refers to the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures as a textual 
justification for protecting the activity of the couple in the sanctity of their home,137 he does not 
ground his constitutional analysis of due process merely in implications from the text of the 
Constitution.  Rather, he sees it more broadly: 
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content 
cannot be determined by reference to any code.  The best that can 
be said is that through the course this Court’s decisions it has 
135. 367 U.S. 496 (1961). 
136. Poe, 367 U.S. at 523. 
137. Id. at 543, 548.  Indeed, he quotes Justice Brandeis’ dissent in Olmstead in this regard.  Id. at 548.
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represented the balance which our nation, built upon postulates of 
respect for liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty 
and the demands of organized society.  The supplying content to 
this constitutional concept has the necessity of a rational process, 
but certainly has not been one where judges have felt free to roam 
where unguided speculation might take them.  The balance of 
which I speak is the balance struck by this country, having regard 
to what history teaches are the traditions from which it develops as 
well as the traditions from which it broke.  That tradition is a living 
thing.  A decision of this Court which radically departs from it 
could not long survive, while a decision which builds on what has 
survived is likely to be sound.  No formula could service as a 
substitute, in this area, for judgment and restraint.138
When he speaks of due process being “the balance which our nation, built upon the 
postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty and demands 
of an organized society,” he seems to be speaking of Rawls’ original process of consensus struck 
behind the veil of ignorance.  When he speaks of that tradition being a “living thing” he must in 
some sense be speaking about the same principles that Rawls speaks of in the concept of 
reflective equilibrium or, more broadly, public reason.  And when he says that a decision that 
“radically departs” from that living tradition cannot long survive, his words sound of the 
corrective force of reflective equilibrium in maintaining a well ordered society that understands 
the core principles which its people have negotiated and continue to negotiate as central to their 
perception of a proper moral existence.
My colleague, Professor Bruce Ledewitz, has written an insightful and provocative piece 
on Harlan’s opinion entitled Justice Harlan’s Law and Democracy.139  Professor Ledewitz 
observes that when Harlan speaks of a decision that could not long survive, he is speaking of a 
process that is more than merely a dialog between the Court and the people; rather, “it is the 
138. Id. at 542. 
139. Bruce Ledewitz, Justice Harlan’s Law and Democracy, 20 J.L. & POL. 373 (2004). 
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people, and not the court, that control.”140  The tradition that is a living thing according to Harlan 
is, as Ledewitz argues, “the constitutional vision of the people.”141
The process by which the erroneous judicial decisions will ultimately be discarded does 
not come, however, as something achieved at the ballot box.  “A judicial decision outside the 
main stream of American understanding of the Constitution will be worn away over time.  There 
need be no single moment, like an election, in which one could plausibly say the people have 
spoken.  There need be no special popular mobilization.”142  The process is “cultural” and 
“organic” but it is greater than these; Professor Ledewitz argues that, at root, Harlan “is making a 
claim about governance.”143  “When the nation – the people – set the balance of due process or 
decide concerning any other constitutional realm, the people have the right to rule.  We have 
only one word that adequately describes rule by the people.  That word is democracy.  Justice 
Harlan is describing our democracy.”144
In this conception, democracy is like gravity, an irresistible force pulling errant legal 
decisions down to the earth where the people want them.  That gravity certainly does not work 
the same in all political societies; in order for democratic forces to perform this magical, 
corrective function, democratic institutions must be in place.  Federalism, separation of powers, 
the specification of human rights in fundamental documents, their enforcement by courts not 
controlled solely by majoritarian forces, indeed, the presence of anti-power,145 are all necessary 
prerequisites for these gravitational forces to function effectively.146
140. Ledewitz, supra note 143, at 329.
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145. Petitt tells us:
The protection of the individual is mainly ensured in our society by the 
institutions of a non-threatening defense system and nonvoluntaristic rule of 
law.  The nonvoluntaristic regimen of law – a common law dispensation or a 
44
Harlan is indeed describing something in terms very comfortable to the political 
philosophy of Rawls.  But is it “democracy” in the ordinary sense of that word, the passing 
majority view, or is it more the deeper consensus on the values of justice Rawls believes we 
ultimately espouse in public reason?  Rawls spoke to this in his discussion of the role of the 
Supreme Court in Political Liberalism.147
For Rawls, when the people exercise their power to establish a new government, they set 
up a “higher law,” one that has the direct authority “of the will of We the People,” a law that 
“binds and guides” the ordinary power their government exercises in everyday law-making.148  A 
democratic constitution is “a principled expression in higher law of the political ideal of the 
people to govern itself in a certain way” and the “aim of public reason is to articulate this 
ideal.”149
The Supreme Court’s role in this process is profound. It must “give due and continuing 
effect to public reason by serving as its institutional exemplar.”150  Indeed, “public reason is the 
sole reason the court exercises.  It is the only branch of government that is visibly on its face the 
creature of that reason and of that reason alone.”151  In doing so, however, it does not assume the 
Constitutionally governed one – will involve law that cannot be changed in 
certain respects at the will of any majority, even a parliamentary majority; in this 
way it will serve to reduce the exposure of minorities to majority will[0].
Pettit, supra note 35, at 590.
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they seek, in the passions of the moment, to change the fundamental principles that make up our national consensus 
as they are to recognize them as the operating principle in the normal, law-making process.   JAMES MADISON, 
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role as the ultimate power in the society.  That ultimate power “is held by the three branches in a 
duly specified relation with each responsible to the people.”152
But this hardly makes the Court the handmaiden of the vagaries of the ordinary 
democratic processes.  The Court plays a vital role “as one of the institutional devices to protect 
the higher law,”153 mostly, as it turns out, by checking those skilled in manipulating the ordinary 
processes of law-making in ways to threaten the vitality of that higher law.  In doing this, the 
Court is, in fact, serving the higher law, and highest goals, the rational process of societal 
consensus has sought to achieve:
By applying public reason the court is to prevent [the higher law] 
from being eroded by the legislation of transient majorities, or 
more likely, by organized and well-situated narrow interests skilled 
at getting their way. If the court assumes this role and effectively 
carries it out, it is incorrect to say that it is straight-forwardly 
antidemocratic. It is indeed antimajoritarian with respect to 
ordinary law, for a court with judicial review can hold such law 
unconstitutional. Nevertheless, the higher authority of the people 
supports that. The court is not antimajoritarian with respect to 
higher law when its decisions reasonably accord with the 
constitution itself and with its amendments and politically 
mandated interpretations. 154
Justices serve best when they appeal “to the political values they think belong to the most 
reasonable understanding of the public conception and its political values of justice and public 
reason . . . [values] that all citizens as reasonable and rational might reasonably be expected to 
endorse.”155  They must not succumb to the exigencies of the moment, no matter how 
widespread the call may be to disregard that higher law in a time of crisis.  The court must act as 
a conscience, reminding a troubled majority of the values they established at a time when reason 
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and a fundamentally moral process produced a consensus on values that were meant to endure.  
If they do not, over time, public reason will correct them.
Indeed, Professor Ledewitz argues that the democratic process Harlan describes is 
corrective only.  Judges need to rely upon rationality and restraint, and hope that the democratic 
forces confirm their judgment over time.156  Rawls observes that:
The constitution is not what the Court says it is. Rather, it is what 
the people acting constitutionally through the other branches 
eventually allow the Court to say it is. A particular understanding 
of the constitution may be mandated to the Court by amendments, 
or by a wide and continuing political majority, as it was in the case 
of the New Deal.157
Hopefully, though, judges can at least be aware that these forces exist and, more vitally, the 
rational process of negotiation which influences them.  Through contemplation of the process of 
“original position,” judges may find their decisions will weather the test of time.  Through this 
process, they may sense the core, and feel the heart, of the conception of justice probable cause 
serves and protects.  The court can come home to reason by seeing what probable cause would 
mean when viewed through the rational process of the original position and the common good 
that process seeks to bring about.
At the root of this process, as Harlan tells us, is not so much “a series of isolated points 
pricked out in terms of the taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the 
right to keep and bear arms; the right from unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on.”158
Rather, the freedom which is at the core of the Constitution and which is profoundly expressed in 
the yearning for a probable cause standard that meaningfully limits the ability of government to 
intrude upon our privacy, is part of “a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a 
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freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints. . . .  And which also 
recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain interests require 
particularly careful scrutiny asserted to justify their abridgement.”159
The insight judges must have is not one they will obtain by sitting as philosopher kings or 
by divining natural law etched in stone tablets.  What should control is simply the voice of a 
rational people who have deftly negotiated with each other with an eye to the common good, 
who have properly accounted for the needs of all who are in the probable cause equation, and 
who are cognizant that the most serious tests of that equation will be when the pressures of the 
moment seem most dire.  Judges need not seek to be the ablest and purest of men, but simply to 
understand that the core of justice the process of probable cause addresses is the product of a 
reasoned people thinking, judging, negotiating, and ruling when they were as pure and as able as 
democratic peoples can be.  
Richard Hooker told us over four hundred years ago that “[t]here are but two ways 
whereby the spirit leadeth men into all truth: the one extraordinary, the other common; the one 
belonging but unto some few, the other extending itself unto all that are of God; the one that 
which we call by a special divine excellency Revelation, the other Reason.”160  Not all of us will 
be blessed with revelation, but all of us have an old friend in probable cause, a friend we have 
always located when we have taken the path of reason in the search for truth.  In the end, that 
should be a comforting thought in a nervous age. 
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